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During the last two decades European countries have enacted a liberalisation 
of employment protection regulations in order to combat their high rates of 
unemployment. Italy is no exception to this. According to the OECD (1994, 
2000), Italy used to be, together with Spain, one of the countries with higher 
labour market rigidity within the OECD. Quite recently, the situation underwent 
some change: labour legislation was modified, and non-standard work regulation 
converged to the levels of other European countries (see Table 1). As a result, the 
share of temporary over total employment in Italy has changed from 5.4% in 1983 
to 7.8% in 1997 to 10% in 2000 (OECD, 2000). 
 
Table 1 - Overall strictness of regulation on 
                 non-standard employment 
  1990 1998 2003 
Austria  1.5  1.5   1.5  
Belgium  4.6  2.6   2.6  
Denmark  3.1  1.4   1.4  
Finland  1.9  1.9   1.9  
France  3.1  3.6   3.6  
Germany  3.8  2.3   1.8  
Ireland  0.3  0.3   0.6  
Italy  5.4  3.6   2.1  
Netherlands  2.4  1.2   1.2  
Portugal  3.4  3.0   2.8  
Spain  3.8  3.3   3.5  
Sweden  4.1  1.6   1.6  
U.K.  0.3  0.3   0.4  
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2004. 
 
More in detail, we observe from Figure 1 a very important drop in the 
strictness of regulation right after 1997, from a value of 5.4 to 2.1 in 2003 (OECD 
Employment Outlook, 2004).  
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It can be safely surmised that this drop in the strictness of regulation is to be 
mainly ascribed to the so-called Treu Act (legge Treu, a law which considerably 
liberalised the temporary work agency employment from 1997 and favoured its 
growth in Italy). As is well known, the literature includes claims both to the effect 
that higher labour market flexibility can help job creation (Bertola et al., 1999), 
and that job security is helpful in containing job destruction and obtaining smooth 
consumption (Pissarides, 2001; Bertola, 2004). In the last two decades, a very rich 
literature (both theoretical and empirical) developed from the matching theory 
proposed in Pissarides (1990, 2000). In this literature, labour market transactions 
are supposed to be characterised by high costs and co-ordination problems, 
originating difficulties in the matching between jobs and workers and bringing 
about the existence in the same labour market of unemployment and vacancies. 
Hence the interest of the framework for the Italian labour market, well known for 
being characterised by serious regional and skill mismatch (Sestito, 1991a; 
Brunello et al., 2001). 
This paper aims to investigate to what extent the Treu Act has affected the 
unemployment-vacancy relationship across regional and skill labour markets. 
Indeed, with higher flexibility, both hirings and firings could be easier for the 
firm, with an ambiguous final effect on labour market tightness. As job turnover 
increases, labour market tightness may fall or rise depending on different 
heterogeneities across jobs, regions and workers: shifts in the Beveridge Curve 
may subsequently be indeterminate. Although the Treu Act elicited considerable  
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interest in the press and among labour market participants, there has not been so 
far extensive scientific work on its effects (we provide, in Section 2, a concise 
review of this literature). 
Our work is also of some interest since the unemployment-vacancy 
relationship has been very seldom analysed in the Italian literature, mainly 
because of the lack of official vacancy data, and no estimates of the Beveridge 
Curve basically exist after 1990. We adopt a fairly recent empirical approach. The 
matching function, re-parameterised as a Beveridge Curve, is modelled and 
estimated as a production frontier. In empirical labour economics the efficiency of 
labour markets has often been analysed through matching functions. Furthermore, 
the interpretation of the matching function as a production function is quite 
common, and some research has been devoted to unveiling the micro foundations 
of this ”black box” (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). However, only recently the 
matching function has been used for analysing matching efficiency with the tools 
of production frontier analysis (after the seminal contribution of Warren, 1991, 
see Fahr and Sunde, 2002, 2005, for Germany; Ilmakunnas and Pesola, 2003, for 
Finland; Ibourk et al., 2004, for France). 
Here we apply this relatively novel technique on Italian data, with the effects 
of the Treu Act as a main focus of interest. We concentrate on quarterly data the 
1992-2001 period, adopting two different measures for vacancies, the ISFOL-
CSA help-wanted ads collected from some important daily newspapers and the 
ISAE labour scarcity indicator. The paper has the following structure. Section 2 
provides a fairly brief account of the main features of the Treu Act, as well as of 
the existing literature relating to it. Section 3 considers the relationships between 
matching functions and production frontiers, while the Italian empirical literature 
on the Beveridge Curve is surveyed in Section 4. The empirical specification and 
the data are presented in Section 5. The results are commented in Section 6. 





2. The Treu Act: Main Features and Implications 
One of the major recent structural changes that affected OECD economies is 
the advent of some previously uncommon forms of job relationships (part-time, 
temporary employment, fixed-term contracts, ...).
1 The label of non-standard 
employment has often been used to cover all these “new” types of employment, 
which share the characteristic of differing from what was usually defined standard 
employment: a job with a full-time, open-ended and secure contract. In Italy the 
growth of non-standard employment has become important only very recently. It 
is widely believed that the Italian labour legislation evolving during the 1960s and 
the 1970s produced a system characterised by important hiring and firing costs 
(Bertola and Ichino, 1995). The most decisive legislative step in favour of non-
standard employment has been the Law 196/1997, the so-called Treu Act (legge 
Treu, by the name of the then minister of Labour and Welfare, Tiziano Treu). In 
particular,
2 the Treu Act made temporary work agencies legal (Law 196/1997, 
articles 1-11). The Act, whose actual implementation took place in the second half 
of 1998, brought about a decisive growth in the number of temporary workers: 
they were already 250,000 in 1999 and 470,000 in 2000 (Confinterim, 2000). 
Temporary, fixed-term, employment quickly expanded, particularly in 
manufacturing and in the more developed Northern regions of Italy. The impact of 
the Treu Act on the diffusion of non-standard employment naturally calls for an 
evaluation of the economic and social effects of this new institution. 
There is a spreading literature which analyses the implications of short-term 
contracts for unemployment (Saint-Paul, 1996; Adam and Canziani, 1998; 
Wasmer, 1999). An important intuition relates to the screening device role of 
fixed-term contracts (Jovanovic, 1979, 1984). They should allow employers to 
observe the productivity of the job-worker pair during a maximum probation 
period, improving matching efficiency. An obvious question, which has already 
been analysed in a few Italian studies (Centra et al., 2001; Ministero del Lavoro e 
della Previdenza Sociale, 2001, pp. 123-125; Nannicini, 2004a, 2004b; Ichino et 
                                                 
1 See on this Felstead and Jewson (1999). 
2 The Treu Act also contained some items on the regulation of on-the-job training for workers aged 
between 16 and 32 (Law 196/1997, articles 15-16), extending previous changes in this field.  
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al., 2005) is whether temporary work leads to some kind of permanent job 
relationship. Nannicini finds that industries that have used temporary employment 
more intensively experienced an after-liberalisation drop of their share of 
permanent employment. Ichino et al. rely on data from temporary work agencies 
and evaluate the determinants of the transition from temporary to permanent 
employment in two Italian regions, Tuscany and Sicily. They find a higher 
probability of transition for Tuscany. Closer to our focus is the study of Centra et 
al., analysing temporary work through regional and skill labour markets. They 
find that temporary work has a higher probability to become permanent in regions 
where the rate of unemployment is lower.
3 
The above works mostly focus on the following question: which is the 
stronger among the greater flexibility implied by temporary work (increasing the 
chance for unemployed to find jobs) and the higher probability of a subsequent 
job separation? More generally, it can be asked whether temporary work brings in 
the formal labour market workers previously excluded from it, or if it urges firms 
that previously would have not posted a vacancy to post one. Finally, temporary 
work could intensify competition among skilled and unskilled workers. The 
evaluation of the latter phenomena calls for a macroeconometric assessment of the 
Treu Act, in the sense of Calmfors (1994) and Calmfors and Skedinger (1995). A 
relatively novel and interesting approach to this kind of assessment involves the 
modelling and estimation of matching functions. Such is the goal of our paper, 
which starkly differs in this sense from the works reviewed in this section. 
 
 
3. Matching Functions and Production Frontiers 
According to the matching function approach, firms (jobs) and workers can 
match each other only with some delay (this account is largely based on 
Pissarides, 1990, 2000). New matches between workers and jobs produce new 
hirings, a process which can be described by the following function: 
                                                 
3 Other Italian studies focusing on the nature of the relationships between temporary work 
agencies, employers and workers are Anastasia et al. (2001), Iacus and Porro (2002), Montanino 
and Sestito (2003).  
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(1)  Hit = h (Uit-1, Vit-1) eit 
 
where i are the units defining the labour market (areas, industries, occupations, 
…), t is the time period, H are hirings, U the number of job-seekers (here proxied 
by the unemployed) and V the number of vacancies. Higher levels of eit, usually 
defined in the literature as the efficiency term, bring about higher Hit levels, for 
given Uit-1 and Vit-1 stocks. This term is influenced by the search intensity of firms 
and workers, by the effectiveness of search channels, by the labour mismatch 
across micro markets defined over areas, industries or skills. Obviously, it is 
extremely important to ascertain whether eit varies across time and categories. 
Some interesting contributions have been appearing in the empirical analysis 
of the matching function, which exploit the deep conceptual and analytical 
resemblance between this function and the commonly adopted production 
function. Consider again equation (1). If the estimation of this function 
concentrates upon the term eit, its evolution and its determinants, then the analysis 
can profit of the methodologies developed in the field of the stochastic production 
frontiers (see in particular Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
Stochastic production frontiers are based on the assumption that the 
technical efficiency of a productive unit is measured by the distance between the 
input and output mixes observed for the unit itself and the input and output mixes 
on the point of the production frontier relevant for the observed unit. In the case of 
the matching function, consider Figure 2, where various mixes of Ut-1 and Vt-1, all 
of them capable of producing the output Ht (H0t), are considered along an 
isoquant.   
  13
Figure 2 – The Matching Function as an Isoquant 
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Obviously, the Ut-1 and Vt-1 combinations on the isoquant are efficient 
points. For each value of Ut-1 on the isoquant they single out the minimum Vt-1 
value consistent with obtaining H0t, and conversely for each Ut-1 value. It will 
always be possible to obtain H0t for Ut-1 and Vt-1 values higher than those on the 
isoquant, but this will not be technically efficient. Then, both points B and C are 
inefficient, while A is technically efficient. Adopting the measure of technical 
efficiency proposed in Farrell (1957), that is the largest radial input contraction 
consistent with obtaining a given output (in this case H0t), the technical efficiency 
of C is OC’/OC, that of B is OB’/OB and that of A is OA/OA. The latter, being 
fully efficient, has an efficiency score equal to one. On the other hand, the 
technical efficiency of C is higher than that of B, which is situated further away 
from the isoquant. 
The literature treating matching functions within the frontier approach is still 
rather recent. The seminal contribution is Warren (1991). Three much more recent 
studies have been carried out for European countries. All these studies share the 
assumption of a Cobb-Douglas functional form for the matching function. They 
fundamentally differ for the data-sets utilised and the variables considered in the 
explanation of inefficiency.  
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Ibourk et al. (2004) consider monthly data for the 22 French regions from 
March 1990 to February 1995, including in the estimates (beside a linear trend), a 
considerable number of potential determinants for inefficiency. They find wide 
regional differences in efficiency and a decline in efficiency over the time period 
considered. The hypothesis of constant returns to scale for the matching function 
is not rejected. The potential efficiency determinants considered in Ibourk et al. 
(2004) explain about 30% of the variability in efficiency (across both time and 
space). Interestingly, the decline occurring in open-end contracts over the time 
period considered has apparently little impact on hirings.  
Ilmakunnas and Pesola (2003) consider annual data for the 14 Finnish 
regions from 1988 to 1997. They too include in the estimates a linear trend and 
allow for some potential determinants of inefficiency. Among the latter of 
particular interest are the average unemployment and vacancy rates of the 
neighbouring regions. The authors believe that in this way allowance can be made 
for the spillover effects highlighted by Burda and Profit (1996), Burgess and 
Profit (2001). Indeed, the average unemployment and vacancy rates of the 
neighbouring regions enter significantly and with the expected signs in the 
estimates (the average unemployment rate of the neighbouring regions has a 
negative impact on efficiency, while the average vacancy rate has a positive 
impact).  
The analysis by Fahr and Sunde (2002) is based upon two different sets of 
German annual data, relating to the occupational as well as to the territorial 
dimension of matching. In the first case 117 local labour markets are considered 
from 1980 to 1997. In the second case data are taken from 1980 to 1995 for 82 
occupational groups. The results suggest that, both across areas and occupations, 
wide efficiency differentials exist. Furthermore, like in the two studies surveyed 
above, average efficiency seems to decrease over time. Fahr and Sunde (2005) 
carry out a more detailed analysis of the efficiency of the matching process in 
Western Germany using the same data, shedding new light on potential 
determinants of search frictions and on the consequences of German reunification 




4. Vacancies and Unemployment in Italy. The Empirical Literature 
In Italy there are no official data on vacancies. However, there are two 
ongoing surveys allowing the empirical appraisal of the relationship between 
vacancies and unemployment, also over a regional dimension. The CSA (Centro 
di Studi Aziendali, Florence) and the ISFOL, Rome, carry out a survey on the 
help-wanted ads published in some important daily newspapers. Another data 
source relates to the quarterly business survey undertaken by ISAE (formerly 
ISCO) in manufacturing. Among other things, firms are asked whether the 
scarcity of labour prevents them from expanding their activity. Furthermore, until 
1999 it was also possible to utilise another (administrative) source: the data from 
the Ministry of Labour (Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale) relating 
to the vacancy notices posted by firms (usually firms only posted these notices 
when they already had actually decided upon the hiring). 
Perhaps because of the absence of official data on vacancies, not many 
studies have examined in Italy the nature and evolution of the Beveridge Curve. 
Sestito (1988) and Bragato (1990) utilise the ISFOL-CSA data on vacancies, and 
find a significant relationship between unemployment and vacancies only in the 
presence of a growing linear trend. Bragato (1990) also finds a significant 
Beveridge Curve for the North and the Centre, but not for the South. A significant 
difference between the Southern labour market and the rest of the country also 
shows up in Sestito (1991b), where vacancies are measured using the data from 
the ISAE survey. In this case, however, no linear trend has to be included in the 
estimates to find a significant relationship between unemployment and vacancies. 
The analysis in Di Monte (1992) is based on a similar econometric specification, 
but utilises the Ministry of Labour data on vacancies. The main difference in the 
results obtained by Di Monte relative to previous evidence is that a significant 
Beveridge Curve also shows up for the South. More recent evidence is provided 
by Mocavini and Paliotta (2000), who examine Beveridge Curve plots based on 
the ISFOL-CSA data, and by Destefanis and Fonseca (2004). Only in the latter 
study a direct comparison of the three vacancy indicators is carried out, obtaining,  
  16
at least as far as the 1990s are concerned, substantially consistent results. The 
recent evidence is largely similar to the previous one. A Beveridge Curve shows 
up also in the 1990s, with some outer shift over this period. 
 
 
5. The Econometric Analysis: Empirical Specification and Data 
 
5.1 The Model  
The simple dynamic specification of (1) contrasts with the sometimes 
complex dynamic structure of the relationship between vacancies and 
unemployment (see for instance the Beveridge Curves reviewed in Section 4). In 
order to facilitate the empirical search for an appropriate dynamic specification, 
we re-parameterise the matching function as a Beveridge Curve. This also has the 
advantage of making our estimates easier to compare with previous Italian 
evidence. In order to re-parameterise the matching function as a Beveridge Curve 
we must assume constant returns to scale for the matching function and the 
existence of a steady state with constant average rate of unemployment. It is 
commonly believed that these assumptions are not particularly restrictive. Under 
the hypothesis of constant returns to scale, equation (1) becomes: 
 
(2)  Hit / Uit-1 = h (Vit-1 / Uit-1) eit 
 
In its turn, this function can be rewritten as: 
 
(3)  (Hit / Nit-1) [ (Lit-1 / Uit-1) - 1 ] = h [ (Vit-1 / Lit-1) / (Uit-1 / Lit-1) ] eit 
 
In a steady state with constant rate of unemployment, the hiring rate (Hit / Nit-1) is 
equal to s + g, where s is the separation rate and g is the rate of growth in the 
labour force, L. Hence (3) becomes an inverse relationship between the 
unemployment and the vacancy rates, the Beveridge Curve, whose position 
depends on s, g, and eit. The interpretation of the last term does not change vis-à- 
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vis (1); however empirical measures of efficiency will reflect the evolution not 
only of eit, but also of s and g. Below, we keep this in mind when interpreting our 
results, and provide some evidence on the evolution of s and g in our sample (we 
cannot include these variables in our estimates as we do not have quarterly 
measures for the separation rate). 
In order to understand better the structure of our empirical analysis, consider 
now, for simplicity, the following Cobb-Douglas specification: 
 
(4)  uit = E1uit-1 + E2vit + E3vit-1 + zitJ + Gi1 + Gi2 t + Gi3 t
2 + Gi4 t
3 + Wi TREUt + Hit 
 
where i = 1, … N, stands for the territorial area, and t = 1, … T, for the time 
period (quarter). We posit a simple fixed-effects Auto Regressive-Distributed 
Lags (1, 1) specification; uit is the natural log of the unemployment rate, vit the 
natural log of the vacancy rate; t a time trend; zit a vector of variables potentially 
determining the technical efficiency of observation i at time t;  TREUt a term 
standing for the impact of the Treu Act (whose nature shall be clarified in the 
following section); Hit a stochastic variable assumed to be iid. N (0, VH
2); E, J and G 
are parameter vectors. We assume, developing upon the approaches proposed in 
Cornwell  et al. (1990) and Papke (1994), that the technical efficiency of 
observation i follows an idiosyncratic function of time, and may also depend on 
some variables zit.
4 In order to choose the latter, we mostly rely on the suggestions 
made in previous papers (Fahr and Sunde, 2002, 2005; Ilmakunnas and Pesola, 
2003; Ibourk et al., 2004). 
There are various econometric issues involved in the estimation of (4). First 
of all, it could be asked whether the hypothesis of common E and J coefficients 
made in (4) is actually borne out by the data. Another issue relates to the structure 
of the disturbances. In pooled cross-section time-series datasets, it is likely that 
different units exhibit idiosyncratic residual variances (a phenomenon known as 
                                                 
4 We are aware that the role of the z variables is usually modelled through the maximum likelihood 
approach suggested in Kumbhakar et al. (1991), Battese and Coelli (1995). However, that 
approach cannot accommodate the presence of a lagged dependent variable, as its assumption of 
no correlation between error terms and regressors fails in this case.  
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groupwise heteroskedasticity). It is also likely that residuals are 
contemporaneously correlated across units, a phenomenon initially highlighted 
within the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions models. In order to rely on the 
proper standard errors for inference, the existence of these two phenomena must 
be put to test and eventually taken into account. Finally, there is the issue of 
dynamic specification. The dynamic structure of (4) is arguably too simple for 
quarterly data. A proper dynamic specification search should be carried out to take 
care of this feature, something which can be properly done within the general-to-
specific approach promoted by Davidson et al. (1978). There may be concern in 
this ambit for the presence of small-sample biases in the autoregressive 
coefficients. However, the time-period considered should be long enough (35 
quarters) to make this problem unlikely.
5  
In order to deal with all these issues, we take as starting point of the 
empirical analysis the following general specification: 
 
(5)  uit  =  Ei1uit-1 + … + Ei4uit-4 + Ei5vit + … + Ei9vit-4 + zit-1Ji + 
              + Gi1 + Gi2 t + Gi3 t
2 + Gi4 t
3 + Wi TREUt + Hit 
 
In (5) there are four lags for both unemployment and vacancy rates (a 
specification usually believed to be sufficiently rich for quarterly data; our sample 
size does not permit an equally high lag-order for the zit variables, which enter the 
equation with a one-quarter lag), and slope coefficients can freely vary across 
regions. 
Taking (5) as a benchmark, we can easily test for equal slopes across regions 
for the E and J coefficients, a restriction which yields the following specification: 
 
(5’)  uit  =  E1uit-1 + … + E4uit-4 + E5vit + … + E9vit-4 + zit-1J + 
               + Gi1 + Gi2 t + Gi3 t
2 + Gi4 t
3 + Wi TREUt + Hit 
 
                                                 
5 In any case, the usual GMM-based approaches to this issue are barred by the smallness of N in 
our case (as we explain below, our level of territorial disaggregation is constrained by the vacancy 
measures).  
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Besides positing equal slopes across regions for the E and J coefficients, we can 
also put to test a more parsimonious dynamic structure, yielding for instance the 
specifications in Tables A.3-A.5, to which we shall subsequently refer as (5’’). 
Bearing in mind the above considerations, (5), as well as its restricted versions, 
should be estimated through a fixed-effects feasible GLS procedure that can allow 
for groupwise-heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated residuals. 
Finally, following common practice, technical efficiency for observation i at 
time t can be calculated through:
6 
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5.2 The Data 
The main data source used is the quarterly Labour Force Survey from 
ISTAT (Indagine trimestrale sulle forze di lavoro). This survey involves every 
quarter about 200,000 persons in 1,400 municipalities from all over the country. 
In particular, individual data from 1992:4 to 2001:2 are utilised to measure stocks 
of unemployed and labour force for the three main areas of Italy (North, Centre, 
South). 
With a view to getting as much information as possible from the data, we 
also focus on their skill dimension. We retain two skill categories: skilled and 
unskilled. These categories are defined as in the Labour Force Survey. We 
consider as skilled the labour force with university or (non-vocational) high-
school diploma and as unskilled the rest of the labour force.
7 Relying on this 
segmentation of the labour force we calculate unemployment rates relating not 
only to the whole labour force, but also to the skilled and the unskilled labour 
                                                 
6 For the sake of simplicity, in (6) we posit equal slopes across regions for the J coefficients. 
7 More in detail, skilled workers have post-degree, degree or pre-superior studies (Dottorato di 
ricerca o Specializzazione post-laurea, Laurea, Diploma universitario o Laurea breve, Diploma 
di maturità), while unskilled workers have professional, secondary, primary or no studies 
(Diploma di qualifica professionale - corso di 2-3 anni che non permette l’accesso all’università, 
Licenza media inferiore, Licenza elementare, Nessun titolo).  
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force (e.g. the skilled rate of unemployment is given by the ratio between the 
skilled unemployed and the skilled labour force). 
We utilise data only from 1992:4 onwards because individual data are not 
previously available. These data are very important not only for the information 
they give on unemployment, but also for the construction of a series of potential 
determinants of matching efficiency. Following the works surveyed in Section 3, 
we considered variables controlling for search intensity, for discrimination or 
ranking effects, for firm or industry effects, and for other factors. All these 
potential determinants of efficiency are listed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 – The potential efficiency determinants from the Indagine trimestrale sulle 
forze di lavoro, ISTAT 
Factors Variables 
  
share of unemployed less than 25 years of age 
share of unemployed less than 35 years of age 
share of unemployed more than 55 years of age 




share of long-term unemployed 
share of labour force in agriculture 
share of labour force in industry 
share of labour force in services 
Firm Effects 
Industry Effects 
share of labour force in public administration 
Spillover Effects  rates of unemployment of the other areas 
rates of vacancy of the other areas 
Other Factors  share of part-time employment 
share of permanent contract employment 
 
As already said, we include in the estimates TREU, a term standing for the 
impact of the Treu Act. It is an indicator constructed using the information from 
Confinterim (various years). Knowing for the whole of Italy the number of 
temporary work contracts, it was possible to construct a variable equal to zero 
until 1998:2, and taking values of 0.2 for 1998:3 and 1998:4, of 0.4 for the year 
1999, and of 1.0 from 2000:1 onwards (these values are roughly proportional to 
the actual numbers of temporary work contracts). No allowance was made for 
regional differences in the numbers of temporary work contracts, as they are more  
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or less stable through time.
8 
Focusing on the impact of the Treu Act means that it is highly desirable to 
extend as much as possible the sample after the second half of 1998. This implies 
relinquishing the Ministry of Labour vacancy indicator. We rely instead on the 
ISFOL help-wanted ads - divided by labour force
9 - and the ISAE indicator of 
labour scarcity. As regards the latter, we utilised in the estimates both its raw 
value and its transformation suggested in Sestito (1991b): 
 
(7)  G (ISAE)  =  S × )
-1 (S)  +  f [ )
-1 (S) ] 
 
where S is the percentage of firms reporting that the scarcity of labour does not 
prevent them from expanding their activity, )
-1 ( . ) is the inverse of a 
standardised normal distribution function and f [ . ] is a standardised normal 
density function. 
It should be kept in mind that both our vacancy indicators have some 
problems. Help-wanted ads mostly refer to skilled labour, while the ISAE survey 
relates to manufacturing only. Moreover the help-wanted ads are not currently 
available at a very fine level of territorial disaggregation (indicators are only 
produced for the three main areas: North, Centre and South). As we want to 
compare estimates obtained with both indicators, this effectively constrains the 
level of territorial disaggregation of our analysis.  
It is instructive to consider in Figure 3 the evolution of the vacancy rate 
indicators. 
 
                                                 
8 We also adopted the simpler approach of modelling the Treu Act through a binary variable equal 
to one from 1998:3 onwards. Furthermore, we allowed for the possibility that the Act could also 
affect the slopes of the vacancy terms. The data amply favoured the approach reported in the text. 
Results concerning the other specifications are not reported for the sake of brevity and are 
available upon request. 
9 When analysing the skilled and unskilled unemployment rates, we proceeded to divide 
correspondingly the help-wanted ads by the skilled and unskilled labour force.  
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From 1998 onwards, vacancies increased markedly. This rise is especially 
strong in the North, less marked in the South (vis-à-vis the previous years), and is 
not likely to be explained by cyclical factors alone: the Italian labour market had 
already been picking up for some years (see ISTAT 2003, 2004). However, firm 
evidence on the impact of the Treu Act on vacancy supply requires a considerably 
more complex model than the one specified and estimated here (perhaps along the 
lines of Wasmer, 1999). In the Centre, the two vacancy indicators - while showing 
fairly different levels - have a similar evolution. 
 
 
6. The Estimates  
The basic econometric approach was to proceed to the estimation of models 
(5), (5’) and (5’’) through a fixed-effects feasible GLS procedure, testing the 
linear restrictions implied by the latter specifications and carrying out the 
appropriate diagnostic tests. When both tests for heteroskedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation across areas turned out to be significant, we adopted 
an iterated GLS procedure (which yields ML estimates as long as the residuals are 
normal). 
Before turning now to the evidence about the Treu Act, we provide some  
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general remarks about our results, which are presented in the Appendix. These 
results relate to a semi-log specification, which gave a better fit than the Cobb-
Douglas (whose results were in any case broadly similar). We find for all vacancy 
indicators evidence largely favourable to the existence of a Beveridge Curve in 
the 1990s across the main territorial areas. There is however a ranking in the sense 
that estimates for unskilled and total rates of unemployment have higher fit than 
estimates for the skilled rate of unemployment. 
The hypothesis of common E and J coefficients across regions can never be 
rejected: see Table A.2, where we report both a traditional Chow test and a Wald 
test allowing for non-spherical residuals. Disturbances are always strongly 
groupwise heteroskedastic (while their variance does not seem to vary across 
time). Only when modelling the skilled rate of unemployment we find 
contemporaneously correlated residual across areas. As shown in Tables A.3-A.5, 
the other diagnostics (for serial correlation, normality, and omitted variables) are 
very comforting. 
As far as the significance of the zit variables is concerned, only the share of 
labour force in industry (positive sign, especially significant for the unskilled), 
and the share of unemployed less than 25 years of age (negative sign, for the 
unskilled) reach some degree of significance (all the control variables listed in 
Table 2 were included one at the time, to provide a more powerful test). The signs 
indicate that efficiency is negatively related to the share of labour force in industry 
and the share of unemployed less than 25 years of age. The fact that other controls 
are not significant does not mean per se that these factors are not relevant. An 
obvious alternative interpretation of this result is that territorial disparities in these 
factors are sufficiently well caught by the regional fixed effects and trends. It is 
also noteworthy that our main results do not depend at all on the control variables, 
whose inclusion simply affects the fit of the equations. 
Focusing now more closely on the impact of the Treu Act, let us first 
consider the evidence in Tables A.1 and A.2. We do not present in full the (rather 
cumbersome) specifications (5) and (5’), but single out the estimates for the Wi’s, 
the TREU coefficients. They show the basic message of our paper: the Wi’s are  
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negative in the North for skilled labour, but positive in the South for unskilled 
labour. Throughout the estimates (see tables A.3-A.5) we find much the same 
results, whose implication is clear. The Treu Act generally increases the efficiency 
of the northern labour market (through its impact on skilled labour), and decreases 
the efficiency of the southern labour market (through its impact on unskilled 
labour). 
This is not the only difference showing up across areas. The Southern labour 
market turns out to be much less efficient than that of the other two areas. In 
Figures 4a-4b we depict for the 1993:4-2001:2 estimation period the technical 
efficiency scores for skilled, unskilled and total labour force. We represent only 
the scores obtained with the transformed ISAE and the ISFOL indicators, and 
exclude from the figures the scores for the North, which turn out to be always 
equal to one. 
 






































Roughly speaking, technical efficiency for the total labour force varies from 
60 to 50% in the Centre and from 35 to 20% in the South. Also technical 
efficiencies for the skilled and unskilled labour force experience similar 
reductions over the sample period. By construction, the technical efficiency of the 
central and southern labour markets is adversely affected by the increase of 
labour-market efficiency in the North following the Treu Act. 
In order to gain further understanding of these results, consider Tables 4 and 
5. In Table 4 we provide data for the annual rates of growth of the labour force 
throughout the whole sample, and for two periods immediately before and after 
the implementation of the Treu Act (1996-1998, 1998-2001). Naturally we 
consider separately the three areas (North, Centre, South) and the two skill levels. 
 
Table 4 – Rates of Growth for Labour Force in the North, Centre, South  
 Skilled  LF Unskilled  LF Total  LF 
  N C S    N C S    N C S 
April 1993-
April 2001  0.057 0.042 0.045 -0.017 -0.016 -0.011 0.006 0.007 0.008 
April 1996-
April 1998  0.050 0.028 0.032 -0.019 -0.018 -0.007 0.005 0.002 0.007 
April 1998-
April 2001  0.044 0.043 0.045 -0.007 -0.011 -0.014 0.013 0.014 0.009 
 
  Source: our elaborations on ISTAT data 
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It turns out that differences across areas are not large, especially if the total 
labour force is considered. Also, while the growth of the skilled labour forces 
before and after the Treu Act may explain at least some of the evolution in the 
relative labour-market efficiencies, the same is not true for unskilled and total 
labour force. 
Consider now Table 5, where we provide, again across areas, some annual 
values for the separation rate taken from the work of Centra et al. (2001). 
 
Table 5 – Separation Rates in the North, Centre, South 
  N C S 
     
1994  0.029 0.027 0.031 
1995  0.028 0.027 0.030 
1996  0.024 0.023 0.027 
1997  0.026 0.023 0.023 
1998  0.024 0.022 0.023 
1999  0.021 0.024 0.026 
2000  0.024 0.019 0.022 
2001  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
     
  Source: Centra et al. (2001) 
 
There appears to be a decreasing trend for the separation rates across all areas. 
Differences across areas are even smaller than in Table 4, and comparing the rates 
before and after the Treu Act does not lead one to believe that the explanation for 
the positive sign on TREU in the South lies there. 
As we do not find large regional differences in s and g, we feel entitled to 
interpret our results in terms of matching efficiency. Then, they suggest that the 
Treu Act brought about an improvement of matching efficiency in the North, 
especially for skilled labour, but had no favourable overall effect on the matching 
efficiency of the labour markets. For the South of Italy and for unskilled labour in 
particular, there is indeed some evidence of a reduction of matching efficiency. A 
possible interpretation of this result is that the Treu Act, while increasing the 
chance for unemployed to find jobs, intensified the job competition between 
skilled and unskilled unemployed in the South, through a strengthened ladder 
effect (Collard et al., 2003; Dolado et al., 2002). This explanation requires that  
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after the Treu Act, a higher proportion of Southern skilled workers found work in 
low-skill jobs. In Table 6 there is some evidence which is, at least, consistent with 
such a state of affairs. 
 
Table 6 – Ladder Effects in the North, Centre, South 
  Ladder Effect 
 N  C  S 
     
April 1998  0.117 0.168 0.116
April 2002  0.137 0.202 0.155
     
%  Changes  0.17 0.20 0.34 
 
Source: our elaborations on ISTAT data
 






O) ], where L is employment, 
superscripts s and u denote the education status (skilled, s, and unskilled, u), 
subscript  O indicates low-skilled occupation (ISTAT definition: Operaio e 
assimilati). Hence the indicator is the proportion of highly-educated (skilled) 
employees in low-skilled occupation. Table 6 indicates that the proportion of 
skilled workers that found work in low-skill jobs increased concomitantly with the 
Treu Act in all the three areas, but nowhere as strongly as in the South. 
Comparing the percentage variations of the ladder effect across areas, one 
finds differences roughly comparable to the gaps in the coefficients on TREU, at 
least for the unskilled and the total labour force. According to this interpretation, 
the sizes of those coefficients (and their negative sign in the North) would still 
imply that the Treu Act had a positive impact on the probability to find a job. 
Further research is naturally needed in order to corroborate these results, finding 
perhaps some validation for one or the other of the explanations available in the 
literature for the ladder effect. The latter could in principle occur because of 
overeducation or because of structural factors, possibly linked to biased 




7. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we utilised a matching theory approach to assess the impact on 
the Italian labour market of the so-called 1997 Treu Act (legge Treu). Although 
the Treu Act elicited considerable interest in the press and among labour market 
participants, there has not been so far extensive scientific work on its effects. Our 
work is also of some interest since the relationship between unemployment and 
vacancies has been very seldom analysed in the Italian literature, mainly because 
of the lack of official vacancy data. We adopt a fairly recent empirical approach. 
The matching function, re-parameterised as a Beveridge Curve, is modelled and 
estimated as a production frontier. 
We find largely favourable evidence to the existence of a Beveridge Curve 
in the 1990s across the main territorial areas. Huge efficiency differences show up 
between the South and the rest of the country. The matching efficiency of 
observations from the Southern labour market varies between one third and one 
fifth. Our results also show that the Treu Act did improve matching efficiency in 
the North (mainly for skilled labour), but had a detrimental impact on the 
matching efficiency of unskilled labour in the South. A possible interpretation of 
this result is in terms of a ladder effect, which emphasises the need to focus on the 
skill mismatch in the Southern labour market both from the demand- and the 
supply-side. 
In future work, we plan to get more robust evidence on these matters by 
relying on the ISAE indicators and pursuing our analysis at a finer level of 
territorial disaggregation. It could also be interesting to get firmer evidence on the 
impact of labour-market reforms on vacancy supply, by setting up and estimating 
a more complex model.  
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Table A.1 – General specifications (5) 
Measure of vacancies: ISAE Indicator of Labour Scarcity 
Total u     Skilled u     Unskilled u 
Adj. R2  0.7459    Adj. R2  0.6604   Adj. R2  0.8061
                  
TREU N  -0.095    TREU N  -0.288   TREU N  -0.06
t-stat. -1.19    t-stat. -2.40   t-stat. -0.89
                  
TREU C  -0.067    TREU C  0.025   TREU C  -0.098
t-stat. -1.02    t-stat. 0.26   t-stat. -1.26
                  
TREU S  0.068    TREU S  0.029   TREU S  0.088
t-stat. 2.76    t-stat. 0.56   t-stat. 4.15
             
Measure of vacancies: G (ISAE) Indicator of Labour Scarcity 
Total u    Skilled u    Unskilled u 
Adj. R2  0.7425     Adj. R2  0.6564    Adj. R2  0.8066
            
TREU N  -0.086    TREU N  -0.272   TREU N  -0.056
t-stat. -1.13    t-stat. -2.32   t-stat.  -0.82
            
TREU C  -0.043    TREU C  0.057   TREU C  -0.086
t-stat. -0.62    t-stat. 0.54   t-stat. -1.25
            
TREU S  0.058    TREU S  0.057   TREU S  0.08
t-stat.  3.04     t-stat.  1.17    t-stat.  3.50
          
Measure of vacancies: ISFOL Help-Wanted Ads 
Total u    Skilled u    Unskilled u 
Adj. R2  0.6911     Adj. R2  0.6328    Adj. R2  0.7734
                  
TREU N  -0.019    TREU N  -0.112   TREU N  -0.041
t-stat. -0.22    t-stat. -0.77   t-stat.  -0.54
                  
TREU C  0.064    TREU C  0.147   TREU C  0.04
t-stat. 0.89   t-stat.  1.39  t-stat.  0.44
                  
TREU S  0.053    TREU S  0.055   TREU S  0.076
t-stat.  2.21     t-stat.  1.16    t-stat.  2.34
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Table A.2 –Specifications (5’): common E and J coefficients across regions 
Measure of vacancies: ISAE Indicator of Labour Scarcity 
Total u     Skilled u     Unskilled u 
















                  
TREU N  -0.089    TREU N  -0.203   TREU N  -0.063
t-stat. -1.72    t-stat. -2.47   t-stat. -1.25
                  
TREU C  -0.018    TREU C  0.025   TREU C  -0.04
t-stat. -0.36    t-stat. 0.40   t-stat. -0.71
                  
TREU S  0.061    TREU S  0.021   TREU S  0.093
t-stat. 2.50    t-stat. 0.45   t-stat. 3.09
             
Measure of vacancies: G (ISAE) Indicator of Labour Scarcity 
Total u    Skilled u    Unskilled u 
















            
TREU N  -0.063    TREU N  -0.198   TREU N  -0.043
t-stat. -1.30    t-stat. -2.64   t-stat.  -0.81
            
TREU C  -0.014    TREU C  0.029   TREU C  -0.026
t-stat. -0.28    t-stat. 0.45   t-stat. -0.47
            
TREU S  0.066    TREU S  0.023   TREU S  0.092
t-stat.  2.58     t-stat.  0.54    t-stat.  2.86
          
Measure of vacancies: ISFOL Help-Wanted Ads 
Total u    Skilled u    Unskilled u 
















                  
TREU N  -0.067    TREU N  -0.155   TREU N  -0.068
t-stat. -1.17    t-stat. -1.76   t-stat.  -1.15
                  
TREU C  0.061    TREU C  0.102   TREU C  0.046
t-stat. 1.19   t-stat.  1.41  t-stat.  0.73
                  
TREU S  0.065    TREU S  0.029   TREU S  0.085

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































LEGEND OF TABLES AND FIGURES: 
 
The sample relates to the 1993:4 - 2001:2 period, for a sum total of 313 = 93 observations (for the 
ISFOL indicators, 1994:1 - 2001:2, and 303 = 90 observations). 
The dependent variable is always 'uit, the log difference of the rate of unemployment, where i = 1, 2, 3, 
stands for North, Centre and South, and t is a given quarter. Accordingly, uit is the natural log of the 
unemployment rate, while the vacancy rates, vit, are not logged. MA (4) vit-1 is the (one-period lagged) 
moving average of the vacancy rate. 
 
Variables are not deseasonalised. Seasonal dummies (not shown in the interest of parsimony) are 
always significant. 
T-stat.’s are obtained from variance-covariance matrices corrected through a feasible GLS procedure. 
We usually take groupwise-heteroskedastic disturbances only; for the skilled labour force equations, 
disturbances are also assumed to be contemporaneously correlated across areas. 
 
Ind. shareit-1 and Yng25 shareit-1 are respectively the (one-period lagged) share of labour force in 
industry and the share of unemployed less than 25 years of age. 







3 S are the (territorial) linear, quadratic and cubic time trends. TREU N, TREU C, TREU S are the 
territorial indicators for the Treu Act described in the text. 
 
Adj. R
2 is the coefficient of determination corrected for degrees of freedom. 
F (m,n-k) are F-tests of linear restrictions which, in Table A.2, test specification (5’) vs. specification 
(5). In Table A.2 they are accompanied by a Wald test, allowing for non-spherical residuals, for the 
same linear restrictions. In Tables A.3-A.5, only the Wald test ((5’’) vs. (5)) is reported. 
AB(1) and AB (4) are the Arellano-Bond test for first- and fourth-order serial correlation (distributed as 
a normal). Reset is Ramsey’s specification test carried out by including the square, the cube and the 
quadric of the fitted values (F(3,n-k-3)). J-B is the Jarque-Bera test for residual normality (F
2(2)). BP-
CW is the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for residual heteroskedasticity (F
2(1)). Greene is 
Greene’s test for groupwise residual heteroscedasticity (F
2(2)). BP is Breusch-Pagan test of residual 
contemporaneous correlation independence (F
2(3)). We report only the p-value of all these tests. 
 
The efficiency scores in Figure 4 were calculated from expression (6) in the text (coefficients are taken 
from equations (5’’)). 